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Over the last ten years, cross-border holdings of financial assets as a per-
centage of GDP have roughly tripled within Europe and doubled between
Europe and North America
i. Developments of such magnitude amount to
qualitative changes in international interdependence. Yet the assignment
of responsibilities for financial regulation and supervision has hardly been
altered. Confronted with the rapid pace of market integration, policy inte-
gration and cooperation have been left behind the curve. As Ignazio
Angeloni puts it in this essay, the world is not suffering from excessive
financial globalisation but from insufficient regulatory globalisation. This
is his first message. 
This first message is not a novel one, but it comes from someone who was
until recently directly involved in European and global financial coopera-
tion and in this capacity has lived through all the intergovernmental dis-
cussions of recent years. His sober assessment and his warning are timely
and they carry the weight of first-hand experience. 
Ignazio Angeloni’s second message is much more original. It is that in spite
of the higher degree of integration within Europe and for all the
institutional and legislative apparatus in place in the European Union,
cooperation at the global level within the framework of the Financial
Stability Forum (FSF) is proving significantly more effective. Whereas
European discussions on the supervision of large pan-European banks
have been stalled for several years
ii now, the FSF has been able to define,
promote and monitor a coordinated response to a series of regulatory
challenges raised by the financial crisis. In other words, the EU level is
i These are orders of magnitude, based on an extrapolation of data presented in a forth-
coming Bruegel Working Paper by Jérémie Cohen-Setton and Jean Pisani-Ferry.
ii On this issue see Nicolas Véron, ‘Is Europe Ready for a Major Banking Crisis?’, Bruegel
Policy Brief n°2007-03, August.being quietly bypassed, in favour of an informal an apparently toothless
club of central banks, governments, regulators and international
organisations. 
Things can obviously change, especially in response to events. But
Angeloni’s observation is in itself puzzling. Why can a near-ectoplasm
devoid of any instrument and decision-making procedure succeed where a
near-state is failing? Why are governments apparently keen on
cooperating within the FSF and reluctant to agree at EU level? 
The answer offered by the essay is that EU member countries are reluctant
formally to assign new powers to the EU and therefore prefer the gradualist
route, while they are more comfortable with a de facto relinquishing of
powers to the FSF. Angeloni also points out that the rather ad hoc composi-
tion of the FSF makes it able to address global regulatory issues
effectively. Finally, he points to the strength of the mandate given by the
finance ministers of the Group of Seven (itself an informal institution).
Perhaps also the larger member states of the EU are more inclined to dis-
cuss with the US authorities, to learn from them and to try to influence
them than to negotiate with their EU partners. But whatever the reason,
this is an extraordinary and largely unforeseen development with
potentially significant implications for the future of the EU. 
The third and last message is that the FSF model has strong potential and
may provide a template for the future of international financial coopera-
tion. The relevant comparator here is not the EU, but the International
Monetary Fund, an institution that is also based on a formal treaty and
relies on an elaborate system of governance. Back in 1999, the alternative
to creating the FSF was in fact to grant additional powers to the IMF. One of
the reasons behind the choice not to do this was to avoid making the Fund
excessively powerful. In the event, the Fund has been weakened signifi-
cantly by a series of developments, not least the rise of financial stability
issues and its limited bearing on them. 
As the world has started moving towards an overhaul of rules of global
finance that will probably result in a significant tightening of the regulatory
framework, the question for the future is whether the combination of
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whether there will be a need to resort to a more formal international
authority. Ignazio Angeloni takes a middle-of-the-road stance on this issue,
indicating that the IMF and the FSF will have to cooperate. Perhaps. But
they nevertheless represent two alternative ways to organise international
cooperation, and two rather different images of its future. 
Jean Pisani-Ferry
Director of Bruegel
TESTING TIMES FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE




A year after its start, when some observers were already seeing light at the
end of the tunnel, the financial crisis has taken a sudden turn for the worse.
Governments and central banks are back in the trenches, their first objec-
tives being to maintain stability and avoid further loss of confidence in the
financial markets. Meanwhile, the nature and origin of this crisis are hotly
debated by academics and policymakers, some emphasising its unique
features while others stress the elements it has in common with past
episodes of financial instability. These reflections are helpful, not
necessarily to meet today’s challenges, but surely to understand how
regulators should go about designing a more reliable system for the future.
In this essay I look at the crisis from a different perspective, that of its pos-
sible consequences for the governance of global financial markets. For
reasons explained below, my main emphasis is on the degree of, and
procedures for, international coordination among financial authorities,
both in Europe and globally. I examine a sequence of three interrelated
questions: are the institutional arrangements shaping financial market
policies (banking and financial markets regulation and supervision) satis-
factory? If not, what changes are needed? More importantly, what can be
expected to happen as a result of the crisis? Before launching in, a warn-
ing is in order. Neither the timing (events are still in progress) nor the topic
(highly qualitative) allow for systematic or quantified analyses and firm
conclusions. These will be possible in the future, perhaps. Here I can onlylimit myself to personal views supported by informal arguments and
limited information
2.
In essence my thesis is threefold. First, in today’s global financial policy
architecture, the quantum of cooperation among national and
supranational financial authorities (information exchange, prior consulta-
tion, common decision making, etc.) is less that would be desirable. There
is a growing conflict between the degree of globalisation reached by
today’s financial markets and the national bias that still dominates
financial regulation and supervision. This is true globally but more striking-
ly in the European Union (EU) where, owing to a high and increasing level
of financial integration
3, the existence of an explicit single market goal and
the presence of a common currency, we would expect to see a higher
degree of cohesion in the design and implementation of financial policies
than is the case at present
4.
Second, the current turmoil deepens this conflict, calling for yet more coor-
dination of financial policies if not their delegation, in part, to
supranational institutions. This is most evident in relation to banking
supervision on large cross-border financial conglomerates.
Finally, I argue that one consequence of this crisis may indeed consist of
precisely this outcome, namely a move towards closer coordination at the
global level. Historically, crisis situations have often been catalysts or
accelerators of institutional change. The role assumed over the last year by
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) in stimulating and coordinating the
regulatory response of all major global financial authorities hints at this;
the urgency of the situation and the necessity to act jointly seem to have
overcome the elements of resistance that had hampered the Forum’s
action in previous years. A similar acceleration does not seem to be occur-
ring in the EU decision-making fora, as I will try to explain. Whether
enhanced coordination at the global level represents a lasting trend is
unclear yet; much will depend on whether the political support behind it is
maintained once the emergency is over. The informal coordination arrange-
ments experimented with during the crisis will need to evolve into more
stable and lasting institutions.
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concepts from the recent political economy literature that suggest when
and to what degree economic policies should be centralised or coordinated
internationally. It also explains why these concepts are applicable to the
case of financial market regulation and supervision. Section 2 argues that
certain features of the present crisis are relevant from this viewpoint, in
the sense that they suggest that international financial policy coordina-
tion should be strengthened. Section 3 deals with a closely related subject,
namely the implications of the crisis for central bank policies. Section 4
reviews briefly the existing cooperation arrangements, at the global level
and in Europe, making a number of remarks on their limitations. Section 5
describes the role of the Financial Stability Forum after the eruption of the
crisis, arguing that this represents progress towards more global
governance of financial markets. Section 6 concludes.
BENEFITS FROM INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL POLICY COOPERATION
Should financial policies be conducted nationally or internationally?
Should authorities coordinate among themselves, share tasks, and in what
way? In thinking about these questions it is useful first to review some
basic concepts and criteria recently proposed in the literature for assigning
policy responsibilities among different jurisdictions. In recent years, there
has been a revival of political economy research on the assignment of
policy functions to different government levels, pertaining to economic
policies in general but adaptable to the area of finance as well.
Historical observation suggests that, while national states have
traditionally played an exclusive role in the performance of public policies
within their own territory, in recent times this function has increasingly
been exercised jointly by groups of nations (international cooperation) or
by separate institutions acting on behalf of nations (supranationalcooper-
ation). Intuitively, in an integrated world (economically and otherwise),
cooperative policymaking helps in achieving common goals better and at
lower cost. Theoretical models have been developed showing that
centralisation of public goods provision is relatively more beneficial, other
things equal, when tastes and preferences are more homogeneous across
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when there are economies of scale – policy functions being more effective
or efficient when undertaken by several countries together
5. Naturally, in a
more interdependent world these three conditions tend increasingly to be
fulfilled.
An attempt to measure whether policies are correctly allocated among
national and supranational entities, with reference to the EU, was made
some years ago by Alesina, Angeloni and Schuknecht
6. More recently
Coeuré and Pisani Ferry
7 have examined the governance of the EU’s
external relations in a number of policy areas, including financial markets.
The first of these papers examines the scope of EU policymaking across
several policy domains. It attempts to evaluate whether the transfer of
policy responsibilities from member states to the EU is appropriate in light
of normative criteria and of the preferences expressed by European citi-
zens. One of these policy areas comprises monetary and financial policies,
as well as taxes and public budgets. The conclusion is that in Europe the
desirable degree of centralisation in this area is high and not matched by
the present arrangements. Europeans seem to support a stronger EU role in
this field. The essay by Coeuré and Pisani Ferry examines a similar set of
policy areas but with a different question in mind, specifically whether the
appropriate model of governance is delegation to an autonomous entity or
coordination by national states. While their evidence supports the notion
that EU activity in this area is limited and could be strengthened, their pref-
erence seems to be for cooperative models of governance (international)
rather than for delegation of the task to a supranational body.
These ideas are highly relevant for financial market policies. In no other
area have globalisation and integration progressed in recent years more
quickly and forcefully than in finance. The exponential growth of cross-
border asset flows and holdings by both non-financial investors and banks,
especially after the generalised removal of capital controls in the 1970s
and 1980s, has been well documented. For example, data by Lane and
Milesi Ferretti
8 suggest that among industrial countries total cross-border
assets plus liabilities as a ratio to GDP has increased, in the last 20 years,
from about 100 percent to over 300 percent, with a sharp acceleration in
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financial integration has been lower, though still significant, probably due
to their less advanced financial market structures. Lane and Milesi Ferretti
conclude that ‘the dramatic increase in international financial integration
has been one of the salient global economic developments in recent years’.
The question is, has this indeed translated into more cross-border external-
ities from domestic financial policies and hence benefits from coordinated
policymaking? Simple reasoning suggests a positive answer. Finance
differs from other economic activities on account of the presence of
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. Lenders put their
money at risk without the benefit of the same information on the quality of
the project and of the counterpart that borrowers enjoy. The more informa-
tion is asymmetric, the more the financial sector is inefficient and risky.
Regulatory and supervisory policies have a major impact on the size and
the nature of informational asymmetries; for example, disclosure require-
ments for securities, bank capital regulation, bank supervisory practices
and the like all contribute to influencing (and hopefully to improving) the
risk/return characteristics of investment located in the country where
such policies are in force.
Information asymmetries are stronger across frontiers, since countries
possess individual legal systems, supervisory arrangements and social
and moral habits that are relatively unfamiliar to foreigners. Information
asymmetry is, in fact, frequently quoted as an explanation for home bias
in portfolio allocation. However, financial integration is not necessarily
associated with more informational asymmetries in the system as a
whole. There are counterbalancing forces. The presence of international
investors typically improves market practices and strengthens trans-
parency. Information and analysis available to international investors
tends to increase with demand. Large financial conglomerates, responsible
for a large part of cross-border asset holdings, are also specialised in gath-
ering and processing information on local markets. And, besides, causa-
tion could be reversed: cross-border integration itself is often spurred by
lower information barriers. But whatever the information properties of
global financial markets may be, cross-border portfolio diversification
should unambiguously strengthen international spillovers stemming from
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financial policies, because the latter, formulated and implemented domes-
tically, affect a broader pool of international investorsv. This argument
should hold equally for securitised as well as over-the-counter and banking
markets, since all are subject to ‘home country’ control rules of some sort.
Financial integration therefore needs to be accompanied by growing ‘inter-
nationalisation’ of financial policies (a catch-all expressing a mix of infor-
mation-sharing, cost-sharing, common or coordinated decision-making) to
reap the benefits of globalisation and avoid an undesirable increase in
systemic risk. There are, however, powerful forces resisting a transfer of
policy responsibilities to the international, and even more to the
supranational, sphere. One comes typically from national administrations,
whose role and influence are threatened. Their resistance is powerful
because normally they sit at or influence the negotiating tables where
such transfers need to be agreed upon and implemented. The reaction of
the financial industry is typically mixed. Large players tend to gain from a
more international organisation of financial regulation and supervision,
since reporting duties on international operations become simpler and
less costly. Smaller and more domestically oriented banks on the other
hand feel more at ease and protected by domestic regulations and
supervisors.
SOME FEATURES OF THE CURRENT TURMOIL
The preceding section concluded that the increasingly global character of
finance in recent times strengthens the case for supranational conduct of
such policies or at least close cross-border coordination among
authorities. The financial crisis, due both to features it has in common with
previous episodes of financial instability and to its specific characteristics,
strengthens the tendency towards a more integrated international
financial system and therefore makes the case for a global approach to
financial policies more compelling. Seen from this angle this crisis is not a
new phenomenon but an acceleration of an existing trend.
Views about the nature of the mortgage crisis are divided between those
who stress its novel character (‘what’s new’) and those who emphasiseTESTING TIMES FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE
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the many things it has in common with previous episodes of financial
instability (‘what is the same’
10). What is new is quite evident. This crisis
originated from an unprecedented mix of real estate finance and securiti-
sation. Traditionally, real estate finance (in particular, home purchase
finance) had been carried out through relatively unsophisticated financial
instruments (fixed or floating rate mortgage loans, typically extended
domestically and remaining in the bank balance sheet until maturity) and
characterised by a close link between borrower (a household) and lender
(a bank). This scheme had the advantage of maintaining a close link
between new credit flows and bank capital availability and of facilitating
the scrutiny potential and ex-post monitoring of borrowers. The new model
of home finance, started in the US and which gradually spread elsewhere,
is characterised instead by a very rapid (often simultaneous) transition of
mortgage risk from the originating bank to other investors, often off bal-
ance-sheet vehicles (special investment vehicles, or SIVs) created ad hoc,
through a complex chain of asset-backed securities and related deriva-
tives. In principle, this ‘originate-to-distribute’ (OTD) model served the use-
ful purpose of reallocating risk to investors more willing and better
equipped to hold it. A widely shared feeling among financial authorities
before the crisis was that, though the OTD model perhaps made the distri-
bution of risk less transparent, it nonetheless improved its allocation,
hence making the financial system both more efficient and more resilient
to shocks. In practice, however, the model rapidly evolved into a mecha-
nism allowing banks to extend mortgages to increasingly risky homeown-
ers, using SIVs to escape a proportionate increase in their capital. Another
consequence was an underestimation of risk by the originator, since the
investment was quickly securitised and passed on to other investors. The
final investor in mortgage-backed securities and related financial instru-
ments was typically unaware of the nature and the location of the underly-
ing risk, and for this reason tended to rely increasingly on the evaluation of
‘benevolent’ credit rating agencies.
At the same time, several authors have pointed out that some features of
the current crisis are reminiscent of previous episodes of financial instabil-
ity. Two are of particular importance for us our argument here. First, as
stressed for example by Reinhart and Rogoff
11, the present financial
turmoil resembles past experiences in that it was preceded by a prolongedBRUEGEL ESSAY AND LECTURE SERIES
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period of asset price inflation. In particular, with the only exception of the
correction of the dot.combubble at the beginning of this decade, stock and
real estate markets at the global level experienced an almost continuous
price increase in the ten years preceding the outbreak of the crisis in
August 2007. Prolonged asset market booms, driving prices above reason-
able equilibrium ranges, tend to be self-perpetuating because expectations
are often formed through extrapolative mechanisms, and because it is
riskier for portfolio managers to bet against a general trend in the market.
As a result, investors in boom periods may not pay proper regard to funda-
mental asset values and may underestimate their underlying risk.
Asset market booms were historically preceded and accompanied by
expansionary monetary policy, coupled with fast growth of money and
credit aggregates. This crisis is no exception. In virtually all developed and
many emerging market economies money and credit grew fast (often at
double-digit rates) for most of the 1990s and 2000s. Bank credit has typ-
ically been used to finance leveraged positions in asset markets, most
notably in real estate.
All these features, both old and new, suggest an increase in the degree of
interdependence of the international financial system. Take the originate-
to-distribute banking model, which, despite its shortcomings and the need
for tighter regulation, will in all likelihood become a permanent feature of
the financial landscape (we know from experience that financial innova-
tion, when arising spontaneously as a response to market needs, is sel-
dom reversible). Its presence means that the international financial sys-
tem will be permanently characterised by a higher degree of capital mobil-
ity and risk transferability than has been the case in the past. Much of this
will be across frontiers; this is witnessed already by the fact that a sub-
stantial part of the risk related to the below-prime mortgage segment in the
US (as much as 40 percent according to recent estimates) is ultimately
borne, often inadvertently, by investors in Europe and elsewhere. This
means that to an increasing extent the regulatory and supervisory envi-
ronment of the originator will affect the risk profile of foreign investors;
their local authorities have no power over it except if they can influence the
authorities on the originating side.TESTING TIMES FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE
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Analogous reasoning applies to the other features of the crisis. Asset mar-
kets booms and busts tend to transmit easily across frontiers and across
markets; research in the last decade shows that international asset price
linkages have increased, in particular across the Atlantic. Therefore,
policies that generate or perpetuate booms in a country or area will affect
asset market conditions in other areas as well. Such policies can be in var-
ious fields. Regulatory and supervisory policies in the financial sector are
the most relevant example here, but the same could be said for monetary
policies; in a highly integrated system, liquidity creation in one area affects
monetary and financial conditions in other areas and globally. In theory,
exchange rate flexibility should afford shelter from external monetary
shocks. But experience shows that the ‘insulation properties’ of floating
exchange rates have provided little protection, and the international trans-
mission of monetary as well as asset market shocks has remained sub-
stantial (and has indeed increased) since the transition to floating
exchange rates in the 1970s and thereafter.
Having argued the need for enhanced cooperation and joint decision-mak-
ing among banking and financial regulators, we now move on to the impact
of the crisis for central bankers, then consider how cooperation works in
practice. We first review cooperation arrangements at the global level and
in Europe. Thereafter we consider the special role acquired by the Financial
Stability Forum in coordinating policies to strengthen the resilience of the
financial sector after the outbreak of the crisis.
THE CRISIS AND CENTRAL BANK POLICIES
Though our main focus is on financial regulation and supervision, the crisis
has also important implications for central banking. As lenders of last
resort (LOLR), central banks are the first line of defence for financial
stability in crisis situations. Financial globalisation and the growing impor-
tance of large banking conglomerates operating cross border have
increased the need for information-sharing and concerted action among
central banks; LOLR has become increasingly international. For this rea-
son, the channels of, and opportunities for, contact among central banks,
formal and informal, have grown, and they were used intensively inBRUEGEL ESSAY AND LECTURE SERIES
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managing the crisis during the concerted money market interventions
launched in December 2007, repeated on several occasions since. These
episodes have strengthened the market perception that central banks are
responsive to critical circumstances and capable of agreeing quickly on
joint action as and when it is needed.
Significant changes are emerging in several aspects of central bank
policies, seemingly suggesting a tendency towards broadly similar opera-
tional and conceptual frameworks.  The most visible one relates to operat-
ing procedures. Two kinds of approach have prevailed in recent decades
that one can label respectively ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ central banking. Narrow
central banking means that the central bank conducts open market opera-
tions with only a limited number of financial instruments and
counterparties, in extreme cases only treasury paper and a few large com-
mercial banks or primary dealers. This approach implies lower financial risk
for the central bank but requires a smooth-running money market so that
liquidity can reach market participants without direct access to the central
bank. Broad central banking, on the other hand, means that central banks
accept a wide range of collateral and deal with a large number of bank and
perhaps non-bank counterparties. In doing so, the central bank relies on
markets to a lesser extent, but accepts more risk in its balance sheet. As
money markets ceased to function properly in the most acute phases, and
narrowly defined collateral became relatively scarce, pressure mounted on
all central banks to broaden their approach to open market policy. The Fed
increased the range of acceptable collateral (including, notably, mortgage-
backed securities) and counterparties; the ECB did not need to do this
because its internal rules were, for historical reasons, already sufficiently
flexible to accommodate a broad range of counterparties and collateral. A
generalised move towards broad central bank refinancing practices seems
inevitable: the crisis has demonstrated that liquidity strain can originate
anywhere in the system and money markets cannot be expected to work
efficiency at all times. But in the long term there are risks for central bank
balance sheets, and potentially for their independence.
A second area where evolution can be expected is the role, and the rules, of
LOLR. The classical doctrine – lend only to sound banks, at penalty rates
and against good collateral – is increasingly questionable, or at leastdifficult to apply in practice. In modern financial markets, a bank with good
collateral hardly needs to borrow from the central bank at a punitive rate. At
least, the judgement on whether a bank is solvent or not will need to go
hand in hand with a separate judgement about whether the collateral it
offers is good or not. Both are likely to depend on market conditions. The
classical theory of LOLR needs rethinking, or at least reinterpreting, both
conceptually and in its practical application.
A third issue is whether latter events in financial markets require a rethink-
ing of our monetary policy frameworks. Recent years have witnessed the
growing popularity of ‘direct inflation targeting’ strategies, prescribing that
the central bank should adopt as a target its own inflation forecast defined
with reference to a relatively short horizon (say, 18 to 24 months), and
use its best information to calculate and achieve such a target. The ECB, on
the other hand, has always advocated a more elaborate strategy, also tak-
ing into account monetary aggregates and in general the condition of
money, credit and financial markets. One consequence of this crisis may
be to reopen the debate on how to conduct monetary policy, which seemed
to have lost much appeal in the economics profession. Economists at the
BIS have advocated adopting a broad macro-prudential framework, to
which monetary policy would contribute. The balance seems to be tilting
against strict inflation-targeting and in favour of more elaborate frame-
works, responding to money, credit and financial market indicators in a
more systematic way.
OVERVIEW OF FINANCIAL POLICY COOPERATION ARRANGEMENTS
Supranational institutions which design and implement regulatory and
supervisory policies (either globally or regionally) do not exist at present,
and their creation is unlikely to feature on international policy agendas in
the foreseeable future. Formally, national authorities retain full power to
regulate the financial industry and act, when and as needed, to prevent
and resolve financial crises.
This is also largely true in the EU, in spite of treaty provisions assigning a
key role in financial market legislation and its enforcement to the EU level.
TESTING TIMES FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE
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This is because passing legislation in this area is subject to the rather
demanding qualified majority voting requirement under the treaty
12.
While this is the formal state of play, in practice a variety of formal or
informal arrangements set up in recent decades have injected several
elements of cross-border cooperation, making it more interconnected and
complex. A web of international groups created over time provide financial
market regulators and supervisors as well as central banks with a virtual
continuum of opportunities for exchange, debate and consensus-building
in all key areas of banking and financial market regulation. Some of these
groups have gone further, dictating international standards of good prac-
tice that have been successively adopted by participating member coun-
tries, and even beyond, on a voluntary basis. The sectoral and geographical
coverage of these groups varies widely, as documented by various
sources. H. Davies and D. Green have recently provided a useful and com-
prehensive guide to the present international system of financial regula-
tion
13. Other rich sources of information are the website of the Bank for
International Settlements, www.bis.org, for the global arrangements, and
that of the EU, www.europa.eu, for the European ones. Given the complexity
of the existing arrangements, a very brief summary is provided here in two
separate boxes (one for global arrangements, the other for the EU).
BOX 1: GLOBAL FINANCIAL COOPERATION ARRANGEMENTS
International financial regulatory groups have often been created in times
of crisis, as a response to new phenomena or risks requiring enhanced
cross-border cooperation. Since all of them have ended up being permanent
(the G10 Deputies, discontinued in 2006, being a notable exception) and
no comprehensive re-ordering ever attempted, the result is a complex web
of superimposed structures, partly redundant and yet in certain respects
incomplete. Davies and Green, in the book already quoted, provide a useful
representation of these arrangements in the form of flow-chart (see chart
3, page 33 of their guide).
Probably the best known group is the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, in which central bankers and other bank supervisors discussTESTING TIMES FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE
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issues relating to bank supervision and regulation. Created by the G10
14 in
1974, shortly after the end of the Bretton Woods system, with an initial
focus on bank risks deriving from cross-border capital movements under
floating exchange rates, the Committee provides a forum for regular cooper-
ation among bank supervisors. In recent years it has evolved into a broad-
ranging standard-setter on many aspects of bank regulation and supervi-
sion. In 1988 the Basel Committee reached the well known bank capital
accord (Basel 1), setting minimum capital standards for banks in the par-
ticipating countries. After long negotiation the first accord has recently
been replaced by a new one (Basel 2, 2004), more responsive to the nature
and degree of bank credit and market risks. The Committee does not pos-
sess formal supranational authority and hence its conclusions have no
legal force in the member countries; nonetheless, peer pressure operates
strongly in the group, hence its deliberations carry significant force in its
member countries and more broadly. Though its membership is limited to a
small number of developed countries, mainly European, its agreements are
increasingly applied in the emerging world.
Two additional Basel-based committees focus on related areas. The
Committee on the Global Financial System analyses global financial mar-
kets, with the goal of identifying sources of stress ex ante and promoting
improvements in the working of these markets. It fulfils this mandate main-
ly by regular discussions and publications. Its creation in 1971, by the G10
central banks, was spurred by the birth and rapid growth of ‘eurocurrency
markets’, ancestors of today’s global financial markets. The Committee on
Payment and Settlement Systemsinstead analyses and monitors the func-
tioning of the payments and settlements infrastructures, domestic as well
as cross-border, to ensure that they contribute to overall financial stability.
The Committee, which operates with few formal proceedings, has recently
promoted important guidelines and principles defining best practice for
large payment and settlement systems, in both cash and securities.
Banking and financial market issues are routinely also discussed in
periodic meetings of central bankers in the Bank for International
Settlements, which also hosts a variety of background technical meetings
among central bankers.BRUEGEL ESSAY AND LECTURE SERIES
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Other international consultation fora bring together authorities responsible
for other segments of the financial system. The International Organisation
of Securities Commissions(IOSCO) gathers the national authorities respon-
sible for securities markets, while the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) is the analogue for the insurance sector. The
International Accounting Standards Board(IASB) aims at developing world-
wide, homogeneous and transparent accounting standards. Each of these
groupings operates in its own specific area of responsibility, typically by
developing objectives, or principles, that national regulators are supposed
to follow. If successful, these principles become benchmarks of best prac-
tice in the participating countries and elsewhere. These groups work by
consensus and their conclusions have no formal binding power. One diffi-
culty of all these structures is the sectoral nature of their mandate, which
may be a source of regulatory segmentation and inconsistency. To over-
come this, and specifically to deal with the increasing links between bank-
ing and insurance, recently (1996) a Joint Forum was established on the
initiative of the Basel Committee, the IOSCO and the IAIS, to deal with issues
common to the banking, securities and insurance sectors, including the
regulation of financial conglomerates.
International organisations have also incrasingly focused on financial sys-
tems analysis and policies in recent years. In particular, the International
Monetary Fund has focused on financial market analysis and has become
a source of financial standards in its own right, as well as comprehensive
country-by-country financial sector evaluation (Financial Sector
Assessment Programs, or FSAP). Moreover, other regulatory areas have
their own international arrangements, such as the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) on money laundering and other criminal financial activities,
and the International Forum for Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR) for
auditing.
The Financial Stability Forum, created by the G7 in 1998 in the wake of the
Russian default and the LTCM crisis to ‘promote international financial
stability, improve the functioning of financial markets and reduce the
tendency for financial shocks to propagate from country to country’, has a
special position. One reason for this is its broad area of competence,TESTING TIMES FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE
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expressed in its aforementioned mandate. A second reason is its broad
composition, including political authorities (treasuries) as well as
supervisors and central banks, plus all key international fora and
institutions (its exact composition is detailed in a footnote). A third reason
is its strong political accountability, since the FSF reports directly to the G7.
Despite its potential, however, the FSF had initially played a rather minor
role, rising to prominence only in recent months, as set out below.
A number of observations can be made. First, the global fora are charac-
terised by marked sectoral segmentation. Though as a whole they cover
most relevant sectors and areas (banking, securities, insurance, payments
systems, ratings, accounting, etc.), each body in itself tends to be highly
specialised. Groups with horizontal mandates (such as the Joint Forum)
play a limited role. This can hamper policy effectiveness in a financial land-
scape increasingly dominated by institutions offering broad menus of
financial services and by financial instruments fulfilling multiple roles.
Geographical segmentation is also an issue. Global cooperation arrange-
ments include mainly industrialised countries. This is likely to become an
obstacle going forward if, as historical experience suggests, financial inte-
gration among emerging markets follows trade integration: the latter has
been soaring in recent years. Geographical limitation is increasingly a
problem also for the EU fora, whose membership is by definition restricted
to EU members. It is difficult today to think of regulatory areas and policies
that can meaningfully be considered to concern the European area alone.
For example, most challenges for European regulators and supervisors in
recent years have come from financial innovation phenomena originating
elsewhere.
he fact that all global financial cooperation arrangements operate on
consensus limits their effectiveness. Moreover, the various groups differ in
their degree of ambition; some have promoted highly influential (and at
times controversial) agendas, such as the Basel accords, while others have
remained discussion fora. This can be a source of regulatory unevenness.
For example, enhancing the role of ratings in the determination of bank
capital requirements implies proper oversight of rating providers.BRUEGEL ESSAY AND LECTURE SERIES
22
In Europe, unanimity is no longer needed in certain areas; for example, the
main directives approved recently under the Financial Services Action Plan
(FSAP) require only a qualified majority in the Council. But as we have
already noted, this requirement is still quite demanding. Moreover, in prac-
tice there remains considerable hesitation in promoting initiatives that are
not generally supported.
BOX 2: FINANCIAL POLICY COOPERATION IN THE EU
The EU is unique in the sphere of international financial cooperation in that
it has made the development of an integrated continental financial market
an explicit policy goal, and has developed legal arrangements to achieve it.
There is specific legislation (composed of the treaties and by European
laws, or directives) as well as formal procedures for translating this legisla-
tion into national jurisdictions. From an operational viewpoint, however,
financial regulation and supervision in the EU remain under national control
in the sense that the regulatory interface between banks and other
financial institutions is national, not European, authorities.
There are broadly three legal bases for EU competence in this area (see the
piece by Coeuré and Pisani Ferry, already mentioned, for a more extensive
discussion). The first stems from the single market chapter of the treaty,
which also covers financial services. The second and the third derive indi-
rectly from the existence of a single currency. The treaty requires that the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) contribute to the smooth con-
duct of national policies related to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and the stability of the financial system. This reflects the close
links between the balance sheets of the banking system and that of the
central bank (which accepts bank assets as collateral) on the one hand,
and with the transmission mechanism of monetary policy on the other.
Moreover, the treaty assigns to the ESCB the mandate to safeguard the
smooth functioning of payment systems. This area of competence is rather
narrow, referring to payment systems only, but the responsibility of the
ESCB is exclusive.
Leaving legislation aside (to which the EU Council, the European ParliamentTESTING TIMES FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE
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and the Commission contribute), the main EU decision- making forum on
financial issues at the political level is the Economic and Financial Affairs
Council, or Ecofin. Decisions formally require a qualified majority but are
often taken by consensus (with occasional dissent). Ecofin agendas per-
taining to financial markets are prepared by the Economic and Financial
Committee (EFC), which in turn avails itself of a number of substructures.
In the field of financial services, the EFC meets in a specific formation and
background material is prepared by the Commission services (mainly DG
EcFin and DG Internal Market).
The distinction between the Ecofin (including the finance ministers of all
27 member states) and the Eurogroup (comprising only the 15 countries
that have adopted the euro) is important here. As we have seen, EU compe-
tence for financial markets depends strongly (though not exclusively) on
the existence of the single currency, and research has shown that the euro
is a key driver of financial integration. In principle this should imply a dis-
tinct role for euro-area ministers on financial regulation. In fact, due to its
informal nature the Eurogroup plays only a limited role, and all decision-
making functions belong to Ecofin, a more heterogeneous grouping where
forging consensus is more complex.
The EU institutional architecture in the financial area has grown significant-
ly since the introduction of the euro. Two directions have been taken. At the
central banking level, the ESCB created a Banking Supervision Committee
(BSC), comprising member countries’ central banks and other national
banking supervisors. The BSC is a natural forum of discussion and informa-
tion- exchange on banking and financial stability issues, particularly when
they are at the crossroads with central bank competence (such as liquidity
policy, central bank collateral policies, payments systems, etc.). At the
political and regulatory level, the launch in 1999 of the Financial Services
Action Plan (FSAP), a broad programme of legislation covering virtually all
parts of the financial sector and, in 2001, the launch of its institutional
counterpart, the so-called Lamfalussy framework, led to a dramatic
increase in the number of group and committee structures (again, Davies
and Green have a useful flow-chart, see chart 5, page 128 of their guide).
The relevant ‘comitology’ was set up in formal terms on four levels; inBRUEGEL ESSAY AND LECTURE SERIES
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essence the first two (basic principles and more detailed legislation and
regulation) pertain to EU legislators in cooperation with national political
authorities, whereas the second two (so-called ‘level 3’ and ‘level 4’), com-
bining supervisory cooperation, national implementation of EU rules and
ensuring a level playing field, rely crucially on the capacity and willingness
to cooperate of national supervisors. A key step was the creation of the so-
called ‘level 3’ committees (the Committee of European Banking
Supervisors, or CEBS, on banking, the Committee of European Securities
Regulators, or CESR, and the Committee of European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Supervisors, or CEIPOS), with the mandate to pro-
mote, each in its own sphere of competence, the consistent application of
EU legislation across all member states. The role of these committees is
discussed further in the main text.
A recent episode serves to illustrate the difficulty encountered by the EU in
enacting reforms that, though of key importance from an EU-systemic per-
spective, face resistance because of diverging national views or interests.
The Ecofin’s attention recently focused on the effectiveness (or lack there-
of) of the Lamfalussy framework, notably in a number of key areas: main-
taining an efficient flow of information among authorities; ensuring consis-
tent application of European legislation across borders; simplifying compli-
ance with regulatory and supervisory requirements, particularly for large
conglomerates operating in several EU countries; supporting prompt and
well-informed action in crisis situations. According to the ‘framework’, in
achieving these goals a major role is supposed to be played by the Level 3
Committees (L3Cs), whose function is to promote consistent implementa-
tion of legislation and efficient supervisory action in the Union as a whole.
In late 2007 and early 2008 the Ecofin examined several proposals, even-
tually discussed in the April 2008 informal Ecofin meeting in Slovenia.
There was initial consensus that a key issue would be to grant L3Cs suffi-
cient room for manoeuvre to ensure a level playing field in regulatory and
supervisory terms. Views diverged on how to do this, and particularly on
how binding their decisions should be. The most radical position was taken
by Hungary, which suggested the creation of a new Europe-vide financial
supervisory authority, modelled on the European Central Bank. Thisproposal was difficult to implement because it required a change in the
current treaties. The UK proposed to set up, by legislation, new cross-
border groups – supervisory colleges and stability groups – to deal both
with cooperation and information exchange in normal times and to ensure
an appropriate response to crises. This proposal, innovative and consistent
with the approach followed at the same time in the FSF (see below), was
somewhat outside the existing Lamfalussy framework. Italy’s proposal
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focused on two goals: the establishment of a common set of rules (‘single
rulebook’) to be applied by national supervisors, so that similar cases
would be treated equally in all countries, and the establishment of integrat-
ed supervision of cross-border groups. All this was to be achieved either by
transforming the L3Cs into permanent agencies, or by giving them suffi-
ciently binding force through new EU legislation. The Commission sum-
marised the debate in four options, in increasing order of ambition: 1) clar-
ifying the existing Commission decisions concerning the role and tasks of
the committees; 2) as above, but also strengthening their mandate on
supervisory cooperation and convergence; 3) including existing and new
tasks of L3Cs in EU legislation and relevant directives; 4) transforming
L3Cs into permanent EU agencies.
In essence the qualitative divide was between not using (proposals 1 and
2) or using (3 and 4) EU ‘hard law’ to strengthen the role of the commit-
tees. The Ecofin discussion confirmed the reluctance to move beyond a
‘soft’ approach based on Commission decisions (option 2) to the more
powerful legislative instrument. Ministers adopted a conservative, gradual-
ist stance: try a modest approach first, simply clarifying and strengthening
the committees’ mandates, and then perhaps review it later. Such a posi-
tion may also have been influenced by concerns that strengthening the
L3Cs would erode the position of certain national banking groups, or the
influence of national administrations, or both.
But this conservative position ignored two decisive facts: first, the commit-
tees’ existing charters, if interpreted literally, already contained the main
elements necessary to make progress in the four priority areas above
16. If
this has not happened so far, it is hard to believe that simply adapting the
mandates without more legal force can make a difference. Moreover, grad-
ualism is not a promising option when financial stability is at risk. Although
TESTING TIMES FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE
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tion of the mortgage crisis, and amid major concern for the stability of
some large banks exposed to the crisis, little or no support was garnered
for proposals which could have strengthened the EU regulatory and super-
visory environment in a decisive way.
In sum, two things seem to be lacking in the present configuration of
international regulatory arrangements (both at global but also at EU level).
The first is binding force; decisions often tend to converge on the ‘minimum
common ground’, and therefore lack ambition and vision. The second is
sectoral and geographical breadth. These are areas where the recent expe-
rience of the FSF, to which we now turn, is of interest and from which some
useful lessons can be learned.
THE NEW ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM (FSF)
We have already mentioned that the FSF possesses one key element which
boosts its effectiveness: broad participation, both sectoral and
geographical. Virtually all authorities, national and international, having
the information and influence necessary to deal with any specific problem
are represented in the FSF
17. However, this is not sufficient; the comprehen-
sive nature of a group’s attendance list does not necessarily imply effec-
tiveness, and may even create confusion. Other complementary elements
are a strong mandate, clear focus and good management and leadership.
In October 2008, two months after the onset of the crisis, the G7 ministers
and governors meeting in Washington for the IMF/World bank annual meet-
ings asked the FSF to ‘undertake an analysis of the causes and
weaknesses that have produced the turmoil and to set out recommenda-
tions for increasing the resilience of markets and institutions going for-
ward’, and to report back to the G7 at the spring meetings (April 2008).
This mandate per se is remarkable, first because of its authority (coming
from the highest political level), second for its clear and pragmat-
ic/operational content. The reference to ‘analysis’ and ‘recommendations’
left no doubt that the FSF was in a short time to come up with proposals
that, given the gravity and urgency of the situation, would quickly become
BRUEGEL ESSAY AND LECTURE SERIES
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action in all countries involved. As such, the G7 mandate was a significant
act of global financial governance, unprecedented in nature and content
though fully consistent with the original FSF mandate.
The organisational style was also important (see the website
http://www.fsforum.org/). After an initial overview and prioritisation of the
issues the mandate was broken down into specific tasks, assigned to indi-
vidual national authorities or international groups present in the FSF,
depending on competence and expertise. A restricted working group, com-
posed mainly of supervisors and central bankers, was set up to discuss
technical aspects in detail and to come up with recommendations. This
ensured that the FSF members possessing the necessary technical expert-
ise would be in the driving seat from the beginning, and would thus come
up with policy proposals which were sound.
The report presented in April 2008 at the Washington meetings (available
on the aforementioned website) was comprehensive and ambitious in sev-
eral ways. The bottom line is a sequence of some 65 detailed policy
actions, to be undertaken by national authorities, international bodies, the
private sector and the FSF itself, by a tight deadline. They are divided into
five areas:
1. Strengthening prudential instruments (capital provision, liquidity
management, risk controls);
2. Enhancing market information (transparency and valuation
procedures);
3. Reforming credit rating (both their provision and use);
4. Enhancing the authorities’ response to risks;
5. New arrangements to respond to stress situations.
Since the document is rather long, a summary of the list of recommended
policy actions is provided in Box 3, overleaf.BRUEGEL ESSAY AND LECTURE SERIES
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BOX 3: SUMMARY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FSF TO THE G7
The first chapter calls upon the BCBS, IOSCO and national supervisors grad-
ually to raise capital requirements for several instruments, including com-
plex structured products, liquidity facilities for conduits and credit risks in
banks’ trading books; to review the capital adequacy of monoline insurers;
to issue guidance on the management of liquidity risks; to strengthen bank
risk management practices using the supervisory powers implied by Pillar
2 of the Basle II accord. It also calls upon market participants to review
internal compensation practices and remove incentives to excessive risk-
taking, and to review the soundness of the existing operational, legal and
settlement infrastructures for over-the-counter derivatives.
The second chapter calls upon market participants and supervisors to
review their risk disclosure practices, giving detailed indications about
information to be provided. The new guidelines are to be used to make
robust risk disclosure on the occasion of the 2008 mid-year reports. It calls
upon the BCBS and the IASB to promote, through Pillar 3 of Basle II and bet-
ter accounting standards, a more effective and internationally consistent
disclosure of off balance-sheet exposures. It calls upon the BCBS, IASB and
market participants to improve internal valuation practices in a variety of
ways. Securities market regulators and private agents are invited to join
forces to improve the transparency of securitisation practices.
In the third chapter, a number of recommendations are set out to improve
the production of credit ratings, inter alia by avoiding conflicts of interests
within the rating agencies; IOSCO is asked to issue a new code of conduct
by mid-2008. Specific recommendations are directed at improving the
quality of ratings for structured products. Finally, market participants and
supervisors are asked to limit their reliance on credit ratings.
In the fourth chapter, several policy actions are designed to improve the
authorities´ ability to evaluate risk. Supervisory authorities are to enhance
their collaboration and information exchange, specifically through the
establishment by the end of 2008 of colleges of supervisors for the largest
financial institutions. The FSF itself is to strengthen its risk monitoringTESTING TIMES FOR GLOBAL FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE
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work, inter aliathrough better collaboration with other international bodies
and regular contacts with financial market participants.
Finally, in the fifth chapter, the recommendations focus on the authorities’
ability to deal with stress situations. In particular, central banks are asked
to ensure that their liquidity management frameworks are flexible enough
to accommodate market needs in difficult circumstances. Authorities are
also to strengthen their cooperation in crisis management across borders,
and strengthen deposit insurance schemes.
These recommendations add up to a programme for reform of a large part
of the global financial system. Most recommendations have an immediate
operational impact in areas that fall under the direct competence of
national regulators and supervisors. The document clearly signals that the
FSF, in which most of them are represented, is to coordinate their action
and embodies their regulatory and supervisory power. The document also
contains a broad range of initiatives to be undertaken by international
organisations, specialised supervisory groups (such as BCBS and IOSCO),
standard-setters as well as the private sector. In terms of breadth of
coverage, the ability to bring together input and authority from different
sources and the relevance of its likely impact, the FSF report to the G7
constitutes an unprecedented act of global governance.
The follow-up after April suggests that the momentum is not being lost; the
reform programme is being implemented, though it is still too early to say
whether it will eventually be successful. Several steps taken in recent
months give us a clue. In an unusually long and detailed press release after
its April meeting
18, the G7 endorsed the programme and set tight deadlines
for its implementation – 100 days for the most urgent disclosure, account-
ing and liquidity and risk management changes, end 2008 for the remain-
ing actions in the list. Importantly, the G7 has also given a mandate to the
FSF to monitor the process and to ensure its timely execution. After an
intermediate report in June at the G7 meeting in Osaka, the FSF was asked
to report back more extensively at the October 2008 G7 meeting in
Washington, a year after the original mandate was given.Several factors together contributed to this remarkable exercise in collec-
tive policymaking. One, already mentioned, was the presence around the
table of all relevant authorities, at national and international level. Another
was undoubtedly the urgency and seriousness of the situation. National
and international authorities normally inclined to defend their own area of
competence and responsibility would hardly have agreed to share informa-
tion and influence so quickly and to such an extent had they not felt
genuine concern about potentially serious consequences for financial
stability, but also for their own reputation. From the outset the strong back-
ing provided by the US has been particularly important. The second factor
was the clarity and decisiveness of the political mandate given by the G7.
Each representative at the FSF table acted with full political backing from
home. In addition, the pragmatic and informal working arrangements
adopted by the FSF may also have played a role. Different areas of work
were identified and assigned to members on the basis of expertise and
competence. The set of recommendations was assembled by a working
group composed mainly of central bankers and supervisors, before being
submitted to the FSF plenary. Effective leadership and internal organisa-
tion contributed to generating a pragmatic, results-oriented spirit which
helped in reaching agreement very rapidly.
CONCLUSION
While financial interdependence and the cross-border impact of domestic
policies have increased in recent decades, financial market regulation and
supervision remain predominantly in the national domain, with only a
modest quantum of international coordination. This creates inefficiencies
and risks, but the more recent crisis experience may help create a
consensus for this to change.
There are signs that this may already be happening. The role of the
Financial Stability Forum in coordinating the regulatory response to the
crisis offers an interesting new model of international cooperation.
Circumstances have contrived to give the FSF the opportunity to fulfil its
original mandate in a way it has not done before.  One trigger has been the
widely shared awareness of the risks involved and of the need to act
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quickly and cooperatively to avert them, but this alone would not have
been sufficient. The ‘FSF model’ – composed of a mix of a strong political
mandate, broad sectoral and geographical representation of competent
authorities and effective internal management – is proving effective and
indicates what future cooperation among financial policymakers at the
global level may look like.
While these seem promising developments, there is no guarantee that last-
ing progress will be made. The informal arrangements that have applied
during the crisis will need to be transformed into more stable structures,
where coordination among regulators on crisis prevention can become the
rule in normal times. This not only requires cohesion and political will but
directly calls into question the role of the IMF. The Washington-based insti-
tution has an established structure and its role as the guardian of stable
and efficient financial markets has increased recently. Its surveillance
tools and conditional lending ability will be valuable, particularly as
financial integration extends to emerging economies. On the other hand,
the FSF’s clear focus and direct link with the leading financial authorities
will continue to be essential. The IMF and the FSF provide complementary
elements of supranational and international governance, and hence will
need to cooperate, no matter how difficult this may be in practice.
In order to derive benefit from this painful experience, it is vital that protec-
tionist instincts and the temptation to exercise indiscriminate controls be
resisted. Neither the regulatory deficiencies nor the errors by market par-
ticipants which are at the root of this crisis fundamentally call into
question the benefits of properly functioning, open and competitive
financial markets. If anything, the arguments advanced here suggest the
opposite, namely that the system may have suffered from insufficient
globalisation (by regulatory and supervisory authorities), not from
excessive globalisation (of financial markets). Understandably, a public
opinion confused by events and angry at the prospect of unfair burden-
sharing in resolving the current crisis may not be receptive to such a con-
clusion; politicians will have a responsibility to help the public gain an
accurate perception of events and policies. The specific solutions chosen
to resolve the crisis will also be important in this respect.REFERENCES
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stimulus and advice. Jérémie Cohen-Setton, Giovanni Sabatini and Nicolas
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9 Again on this point, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) note that ‘the substantial
decline in home bias in advanced economies, together with their more
advanced stage of financial development, has implied a spectacular increase
in the amount of cross-border capital, and hence the potential for significant
effects on individual countries of even modest shifts in cross-border portfolio
allocation’.
10 For remarks along these lines see White (2008).
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Switzerland, the general manager of the BIS, the Vice President of the ECB, the
Deputy managing Director of the IMF, senior officials of the World bank and
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International Organisation of Securities Commissions and the Joint Forum.
Representatives of other organisations may also be invited on an occasional
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In the last ten years, cross-border holdings of financial assets as a percentage
of GDP have tripled within Europe and doubled between Europe and North
America. Yet the assignment of responsibilities for financial regulation and
supervision has hardly altered. In spite of the higher degree of integration
within Europe and for all the institutional and legislative apparatus in place in
the European Union, cooperation at the global level within the framework of
the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) is proving significantly more effective. 
As the world moves towards an overhaul of global finance rules – probably
resulting in significant regulatory tightening – Ignazio Angeloni asks whether
the combination of political mandate, informality and national enforcement
will suffice, or if there is a need for a more formal international authority. 
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